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Document Handling Note: **UNRESTRICTED**

Prepared by: Clinton County EMA

Legal Review Status: Not reviewed unless otherwise indicated.

Purpose: This After-Action Report documents significant actions, impacts, sustained practices, and observations associated with the incident. It is intended to support organizational learning, planning, training, and future preparedness.

20260727 Potential Severe Weather

Published Date: 28 July 2026

Summary

Clinton County Emergency Management Agency conducted Enhanced Monitoring for a potential severe-weather event affecting Clinton County on Monday, 27 July 2026. Forecast guidance identified damaging straight-line winds as the primary threat, with possible large hail, heavy rainfall, frequent lightning, localized flooding, and a limited potential for brief spin-up tornadoes. The county was placed under Severe Thunderstorm Watch 522, and two severe thunderstorm warnings affected portions of the county during the evening. The storms ultimately produced few reported impacts and did not require Emergency Operations Center activation, protective actions, resource requests, damage assessment, or extended response operations.

Clinton County EMA monitored National Weather Service products, radar trends, upstream conditions, power outages, and reports from public-safety partners. The agency also participated in a combined regional monitoring meeting with Southwest and West Central Ohio emergency management directors from 5:20 p.m. until operations terminated at 9:10 p.m. Public messaging and stakeholder notifications were issued before the primary threat period, including updated information regarding the developing potential for brief tornadoes.

Overall performance was rated 7 out of 10. Weather monitoring, National Weather Service coordination, stakeholder notification, and regional information sharing were effective and should be sustained. The event also served as a practical documentation drill because the actual response requirement was limited. The primary observation was that the Public Information Officer form and Energy Lifeline record were not kept current during the active period. Low activity made it easier for attention to shift to unrelated work, which reduced documentation discipline. A second observation involved utility coordination and information timeliness. Outage information was initially available primarily through public reporting systems. On the afternoon of 28 July, an AES Ohio government liaison confirmed that the outage affecting approximately 1,148 customers originated at the State Route 73 substation and resulted from a transformer failure. AES continued investigating the underlying cause of the failure. These limitations did not materially affect public safety during this event but could be more consequential during a higher-impact incident.

Incident Overview and Milestones

Incident Overview

- Incident name: **20260727 Potential Severe Weather.**
- Incident number: **20260727-001; D4H event reference 00066.**
- Operational period: Initial contingency monitoring began on **23 July 2026. Enhanced Monitoring concluded at 9:10 p.m. on 27 July 2026.**
- Area affected: **Clinton County, Ohio.**
- Incident type: **Severe-weather monitoring and coordination.**
- Lead organization: **Clinton County Emergency Management Agency.**
- Supporting organizations: **National Weather Service Wilmington, Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Clinton County public-safety agencies, chief elected officials, utility providers, and participating Southwest and West Central Ohio emergency management agencies.**

Significant Milestones

- 23 July: EMA opened the D4H incident channel and issued the initial public Heads-Up Message based on the Storm Prediction Center's extended outlook.
- 25–27 July: EMA reviewed successive National Weather Service briefings, updated the Common Operating Picture, and issued multiple public weather updates as confidence and hazard information changed.
- 1:42 p.m., 27 July: Commissioners, mayors, law enforcement chiefs, and fire chiefs were advised that damaging winds remained the primary threat and that conditions had become more favorable for brief spin-up tornadoes.
- 5:20 p.m.: Clinton County EMA joined a regional virtual monitoring meeting with Southwest and West Central Ohio emergency management directors.
- 5:20 p.m.: Severe Thunderstorm Watch 522 was recorded for Clinton County and surrounding jurisdictions, valid through midnight.
- 6:50 p.m.: A severe thunderstorm warning included northwestern Clinton County, including Clarksville and portions of Interstate 71.
- 7:13 p.m.: A second severe thunderstorm warning included a larger portion of Clinton County, including Wilmington, Blanchester, New Vienna, Martinsville, Midland, and surrounding areas.
- 9:10 p.m.: With the primary severe threat diminished and few impacts reported, Clinton County EMA terminated Enhanced Monitoring and regional monitoring participation.

Operational Impacts and Response Actions

Public and Property Impacts

- Available records document no civilian or responder injuries.
- No significant structural damage, flooding, debris-management need, or countywide transportation disruption was reported.
- No protective actions were directed, and no damage assessment or resource request was initiated.
- The storms that affected Clinton County were substantially less severe than the higher-end forecast possibilities.

Community Lifeline Impacts

Energy

- AES Ohio outages were monitored during the afternoon and overnight period. Reported outages increased from 1,143 customers at 3:00 p.m. to a peak of 1,189 at 4:00 p.m., then generally declined through the evening and overnight.
- The outage began before the primary storm arrival. On the afternoon of 28 July, an AES Ohio government liaison confirmed that the outage affecting approximately 1,148 customers originated at the State Route 73 substation and resulted from a transformer failure. AES was still investigating the underlying cause of the transformer failure at the time of this report. Available information does not establish that the outage was weather-related.
- Field observations identified impacts to traffic signals in the Wilmington area. No broader cascading impacts to health care, communications, water systems, or emergency response were documented.
- The D4H Energy Lifeline page was marked Degraded-Improving, but its location, impact summary, restoration estimate, and later outage totals were not fully updated.

Incident Coordination

- EMA maintained Enhanced Monitoring rather than escalating to Emergency Operations Center activation. This posture was proportionate to the forecast threat, available staffing, and limited reported impacts.
- National Weather Service coordination supported updates to local hazard messaging, including recognition of the limited brief-tornado potential.
- Regional monitoring provided shared radar interpretation, upstream reports, warning information, outage awareness, and operational status across participating counties.

Public Information and Damage Reporting

- EMA published an initial Heads-Up Message and subsequent updates describing forecast uncertainty, expected timing, primary hazards, warning methods, and protective actions.
- The emergency notice page contained the original Heads-Up Message and four numbered updates issued as the forecast evolved. The updates addressed the Slight Risk, damaging-wind potential, uncertainty in storm timing and track, the addition of a low-end brief-tornado threat, and recommended public preparedness actions.
- Public guidance emphasized completing preparations before the evening threat period, maintaining multiple warning methods, avoiding downed powerlines and flooded roads, and using established damage-reporting systems.
- The Public Information Officer form remained active but showed only one documented timeline update and did not reflect later warnings, observed conditions, declining threat, or operational termination.

Demobilization

- Enhanced Monitoring was terminated at 9:10 p.m. after the primary severe threat diminished and no significant county impacts or unmet support needs were identified.
- Routine overnight outage tracking continued for documentation purposes, but no further emergency coordination was required.

Performance Findings

Sustained Practices

Enhanced Monitoring and Proportional Activation — Met

- EMA consistently reviewed forecast briefings, radar trends, warning products, and evolving hazard guidance.
- Direct National Weather Service coordination identified the changing brief-tornado potential and supported timely notification of public-safety leaders.
- Sustain the current forecast-monitoring and National Weather Service coordination process.

Regional and Stakeholder Coordination — Met

- The regional virtual meeting provided a continuous exchange of warning information, observed conditions, outage reports, and operational status.
- Advance notifications to elected officials and public-safety chiefs identified likely impacts and supported local readiness without unnecessary activation.
- Sustain combined regional monitoring and targeted stakeholder notifications.

Observations

Operational Form Maintenance and Closeout — Partially Met

- The D4H log remained detailed, and the public emergency notice page was updated repeatedly before the primary threat period. However, the D4H Public Information Officer form and Energy Lifeline record were not kept current as conditions, warnings, and outage figures changed.
- The emergency notice page's final numbered update was posted during the afternoon and did not document the evening storm outcome, reduced threat, or termination of Enhanced Monitoring at 9:10 p.m.
- Because the event remained low activity, attention shifted to other work and documentation tasks were deferred. During a higher-impact incident, differences between the incident log, operational forms, and public-facing information could produce an incomplete or outdated Common Operating Picture.
- **Recommendation: Documentation practice.**

Utility Information Timeliness and Closeout — Partially Met

- EMA used public outage maps, dispatch contacts, field observations, and direct utility outreach to assess the outage while Enhanced Monitoring was underway.
- During the operational period, EMA did not receive a confirmed cause, restoration estimate, or formal utility closeout. On the afternoon of 28 July, an AES Ohio government liaison confirmed that the outage affecting approximately 1,148 customers originated at the State Route 73 substation and resulted from a transformer failure.
- The delayed confirmation limited EMA's ability to complete the Energy Lifeline assessment before terminating Enhanced Monitoring. AES continued investigating the underlying cause of the transformer failure, and available information did not establish a connection to the severe-weather event.
- **Recommendation: Coordination review.**

Records and Source Limitations

- The official report will be maintained in the Clinton County EMA physical files, EMA network drive, and emergency notice page.
- Primary records reviewed included the D4H Log of Events, Situation Report, Public Information Officer form, Energy Lifeline record, Weather Events record, and the public emergency notice page for the event.
- The emergency notice page documents the original Heads-Up Message and four numbered forecast updates but does not contain an evening closeout or final event outcome.
- No separate reports were provided by participating regional emergency management agencies or utility representatives.
- On the afternoon of 28 July, an AES Ohio government liaison confirmed that the outage affecting approximately 1,148 customers originated at the State Route 73 substation and resulted from a transformer failure. AES continued investigating the underlying cause of the failure. A restoration estimate and formal operational-period closeout were not available during Enhanced Monitoring.
- No photographs or records of significant storm damage were included because no meaningful damage was reported.
- Detailed individual names, contact attempts, and operational communications remain in the official incident record and are not necessary for this UNRESTRICTED report.